Bid evaluation behavior in online procurement auctions involving technical and business experts

نویسندگان

  • Dingwei Wang
  • Xuwang Liu
  • Lili Liu
چکیده

Multi-attribute reverse auction-based procurement has been widely used by large organizations. The attributes of the auctioned objects are usually divided into two groups: technical and business attributes. They are reviewed and scored by technical and business experts who act as referees in the bid evaluation process. To analyze their bid evaluation behavior, we built a model for a multi-attribute reverse auction. With correlations between the bid evaluations of the different referee groups across the attributes, the bid evaluation problem is not the usual multi-attribute decision-making problem. We assess the cause–effect relationship that is present, and show that antagonism between referee groups tends to grow over time. We tested how this works with data from simulated auctions. To diminish the potential for antagonism between the two referee groups, we propose a modified bid evaluation mechanism. We also conducted role-playing experiments involving the referee behaviors as a means for assessing the proposed mechanism. Our results suggest that the modified bid evaluation mechanism is beneficial. 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Do Auction Parameters Affect Buyer Surplus in E-Auctions for Procurement?

A the initial euphoria about Internet-enabled reverse auctions has given way to a cautious but widespread use of reverse auctions in business-to-business (B2B) procurement, there is a limited understanding of the effect of auction design parameters on buyer surplus. In this paper, we study the effect of bidding competition, information asymmetry, reserve price, bid decrement, auction duration, ...

متن کامل

1 Supplier Learning in Repeated Online Procurement Auctions

1. Introduction Repetition is the key aspect of online procurement auctions as they are often conducted yearly or quarterly or even daily (Elmaghraby 2006; Pinker and et al. 2003). Yet it remains unknown (1) what the suppliers' incentives are for repeatedly participating in reverse auctions, especially for those non-winning suppliers (e.g. Jap 2002); (2) In business practice, whether suppliers ...

متن کامل

A Practical Approach to Multi-Attribute Auctions

In most electronic auctions conducted over the Internet today price is still the only decision criteria for the best bid. This is true for all sorts of auctions in the electronic business areas consumer-to-consumer (c2c), business-toconsumer (b2c), and business-to-business (b2b). Especially for many situations in the b2b area there are other important attributes apart from price to be considere...

متن کامل

Are Bid Preferences Benign? The Effect of Small Business Subsidies in Highway Procurement Auctions

Bid preferences in procurement auctions allow firms from an identifiable group an advantage in bidding against unfavored firms. While economic efficiency is expected to fall as a result of bid preferences, government procurement costs may either increase or decrease depending on the competitive response of favored and unfavored firms. This paper uses data from California auctions for road const...

متن کامل

Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions

We use data from highway procurement auctions subject to California’s Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of firms’ bidding and participation decisions, which allows us to evaluate the effects of current and alternative policy designs. We show that incorporating participation responses signific...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Electronic Commerce Research and Applications

دوره 12  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2013