Bayesian Nash Equilibria and Bell Inequalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
Games with incomplete information are formulated in a multi-sector probability matrix formalism that can cope with quantum as well as classical strategies. An analysis of classical and quantum strategy in a multi-sector extension of the game of Battle of Sexes clarifies the two distinct roles of nonlocal strategies that break Bell inequalities.
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تاریخ انتشار 2009