Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem
It is well known that ex post e¢ cient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods are not interim individually rational. However, the corresponding literature assumes that agents who veto a mechanism can enforce a situation in which the public good is never provided. This paper instead considers majority voting with uniform cost sharing as the relevant status quo. E¢ cient mechani...
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This paper compares the performance of simple voting rules, called referenda, to the performance of interim eÆcient mechanisms for the provision of a public good. In a referendum, voters simply vote for or against the provision of the public good, and production of the public good depends on whether or not the number of yes votes exceeds a prespeci ed threshold. Costs are shared equally. We sho...
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تاریخ انتشار 2006