Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium ∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper compares the financing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in established firms (intrapreneurship). Intrapreneurship allows established firms to use information on failed intrapreneurs to redeploy them into other jobs. By contrast, failed entrepreneurs must seek other jobs in an imperfectly informed external labor market. While this is ex-post inefficient, it provides entrepreneurs with high-powered incentives ex ante. We show that two types of equilibria can arise (and sometimes coexist). In a low (high) entrepreneurship equilibrium, the market for failed entrepreneurs is thin (deep). Internal (external) labor markets are thus particularly valuable, which favors intrapreneurship (entrepreneurship). We also characterize conditions under which there can be too little or too much entrepreneuial activity in equilibrium. ∗We would like to thank Adolfo de Motta, Matthias Dewatripont, Paul Gompers, Jan Zabojnik, Augustin Landier, Josh Lerner, Raghu Rajan, Antoinette Schoar as well as participants in seminars at Amsterdam, Bristol, Chicago, City Business School Gerzensee, HBS, London Business School, LSE, Mannheim, MIT, Munich, NBER, Northwestern, Oxford, Rome, Salerno, and Toulouse for valuable comments. This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant SES 0079176. All remaining errors are our own. USC FBE FINANCE SEMINAR presented by Denis Gromb FRIDAY, Nov. 21, 2003 10:30 am – 12:00 pm; Room: JKP-204
منابع مشابه
Entrepreneurship in Equilibrium ¤ Denis Gromb LBS and CEPR David Scharfstein
This paper compares the ̄nancing of new ventures in start-ups (entrepreneurship) and in established ̄rms (intrapreneurship). Intrapreneurship allows established ̄rms to use information on failed intrapreneurs to redeploy them into other jobs. Instead, failed entrepreneurs must seek other jobs in an imperfectly informed external labor market. While this is ex-post ine±cient, it provides entrepre...
متن کاملA Theory of Silicon Valley
This paper presents a model of the software-focused, venture-backed entrepreneurship found in the San Francisco Bay Area, or “Silicon Valley.” Three kinds of markets matter in the model: (1) the financial market for venture capital, (2) the labor market for engineers, and (3) the collection of product markets successful technology companies serve. The key economic actors are elite “engineers” w...
متن کاملTacit knowledge with innovative entrepreneurship
a r t i c l e i n f o Tacit knowledge affects the trade-off between entrepreneurship and technology transfer. I present a formal model in which an inventor and the existing firm engage in a strategic innovation game by choosing whether to compete or to cooperate through technology transfer. The model highlights how the problem of tacit knowledge affects the inventor's R&D investment and the exi...
متن کاملEducation for Entrepreneurship at the Crossroads of Neoliberal and Emancipatory Pedagogy
Entrepreneurship cultivation and education is an omnipresent and unavoidable educational concept in the educational systems of European countries. The formation, development and the rise of this concept are closely related to modern development trends of European educational policies. Education for entrepreneurship is determined by the social and educational values of entrepreneurship and its p...
متن کاملبررسی رابطه میان سهم بخش کشاورزی و کارآفرینی در کشورهای عضو G20 و ایران
Entrepreneurship is closely linked to the economic and social development of countries, and today it is one of the indicators of development in the developing world. Due to the special role of entrepreneurs in the process of economic growth and development, many governments in developed countries are struggling to maximize the opportunities and exploit research gains that leading a number of pe...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002