On Bringing Consciousness Into the House of Science — With the Help of Husserlian Phenomenology

The title of this paper adopts the phrase of “bringing consciousness into the house of science” from the neuroscientists Gerald M. Edelman and Giulio Tononi, and by alluding to “the help of Husserlian phenomenology” it is meant to announce a far-reaching thesis regarding the very explanandum of scientific accounts of consciousness. However, within a collection of papers entitled “Continental Philosophies of Science”, the title may readily provoke a sceptical raising of eyebrows with readers familiar with Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. Does it not in some way entail the suggestion that Husserl’s phenomenological approach to consciousness cannot on its own claim to be a properly “scientific” enterprise, and that it can only be brought within the house of science if it is able to prove its scientific credentials by providing heuristic assistance to the “real” (natural, experimental) sciences? To forestall worries of this sort — worries that I hope will in the end turn out to be inappropriate ones — let me make a preliminary comment on how I would like the title to be taken.