Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons
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چکیده
This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, many of the other objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few objections to the Humean Theory depend on whether we assume that Humeans are committed to a thesis about the weight of reasons—one I call Proportionalism. In particular, I’ll show how a version of the Humean Theory that rejects Proportionalism can reasonably hope to escape both the too many and the too few objections. This will constitute my defense of this version of the Humean Theory. But then, separately, I will argue that this defense of the Humean Theory is not ad hoc. I’ll argue that Humeans have no reason to accept Proportionalism in the first place. Or at least, no weighty one. There are three parts to the paper. In Part 1 we introduce the Humean Theory and the too few reasons objection. I’ll first lay out the objection, and then lay out the basis for a response on behalf of my favored version of the Humean Theory. There will be an obvious objection to my defense— but it will turn out to depend on the assumption of Proportionalism. This will constitute my argument that the susceptibility of the Humean Theory to
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تاریخ انتشار 2007