Denotational Semantics for Modal Systems S3-S5 Extended by Axioms for Propositional Quantifiers and Identity
نویسنده
چکیده
There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity connective: φ := φ ≡ ⊤ (⊤ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many standard modal logics the concept of propositional identity (PI) φ ≡ ψ can be defined by strict equivalence (SE) (φ ↔ ψ). All these approaches to modality involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom (CA): “There is only one necessary proposition.” In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on the identity axioms of Suszko’s non-Fregean logic SCI . Then S3 proves to be the smallest Lewis modal system where PI can be defined as SE. We extend S3 to a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers such that necessity and PI are integrated as non-interdefinable concepts. CA is not valid and PI refines SE. Models are expansions of SCI -models. We show that SCI -models are Boolean prealgebras, and vice-versa. This associates Non-Fregean Logic with research on Hyperintensional Semantics. PI equals SE iff models are Boolean algebras and CA holds. A representation result establishes a connection to Fine’s approach to propositional quantifiers and shows that our theories are conservative extensions of S3–S5, respectively. If we exclude the Barcan formula and a related axiom, then the resulting systems are still complete w.r.t. a simpler denotational semantics.
منابع مشابه
Algebraic semantics for a modal logic close to S1
The modal systems S1–S3 were introduced by C. I. Lewis as logics for strict implication. While there are Kripke semantics for S2 and S3, there is no known natural semantics for S1. We extend S1 by a Substitution Principle SP which generalizes a reference rule of S1. In system S1+SP, the relation of strict equivalence φ ≡ ψ satisfies the identity axioms of R. Suszko’s non-Fregean logic adapted t...
متن کاملEveryone Knows That Someone Knows: Quantifiers over Epistemic Agents
Modal logic S5 is commonly viewed as an epistemic logic that captures the most basic properties of knowledge. Kripke proved a completeness theorem for the firstorder modal logic S5 with respect to a possible worlds semantics. A multiagent version of the propositional S5 as well as a version of the propositional S5 that describes properties of distributed knowledge in multiagent systems has also...
متن کاملA Simple Embedding of T into Double S5
For a natural number n, an n-modal system is a language with operators [1], . . . , [n] interpreted by world-world relations R1, . . . , Rn according to the familiar Kripke semantics. Double S5 is the 2-modal system determined by all frames (W,R1, R2) such that R1 and R2 are equivalence relations. (The nomenclature system envisioned here would, for example, take S5S4K to be the 3-modal system d...
متن کاملInterpolation for First Order S5
An interpolation theorem holds for many standard modal logics, but first order S5 is a prominent example of a logic for which it fails. In this paper it is shown that a first order S5 interpolation theorem can be proved provided the logic is extended to contain propositional quantifiers. A proper statement of the result involves some subtleties, but this is the essence of it.
متن کاملRepresentability in Second-Order Propositional Poly-Modal Logic
A propositional system of modal logic is second-order if it contains quantifiers ∀p and ∃p, which, in the standard interpretation, are construed as ranging over sets of possible worlds (propositions). Most second-order systems of modal logic are highly intractable; for instance, when augmented with propositional quantifiers, K, B, T, K4 and S4 all become effectively equivalent to full second-or...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
- Studia Logica
دوره 103 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015