Knowledge Elicitation

In this chapter the enterprise of knowledge elicitation, the process of explicating domain specific knowledge underlying human performance, and the cognitive issues that surround this practice are reviewed. Knowledge elicitation had its formal beginnings in the mid to late 1980's in the context of knowledge engineering for expert systems. Expert systems are computer programs that embody domain-specific knowledge and that perform (e.g., decision making, problem solving, design) at levels typical of human experts, (but not necessarily in exactly the same manner as human experts). Knowledge engineering is broadly defined here as the process of building knowledge-based systems or applications. These include expert systems, as well as intelligent tutoring systems, adaptive user-interfaces, and even knowledge-oriented selection and training devices. The process of knowledge engineering involves knowledge acquisition which includes knowledge elicitation and other activities such as knowledge explication and conceptual modeling (Regoczei & Hirst, 1992), as well as the coding of the resulting knowledge, the design of a usable interface, and the testing and evaluation of this interface (Diaper, 1989b). Thus, knowledge elicitation is a subprocess of knowledge acquisition, which is itself a subprocess of knowledge engineering. In order to fit knowledge elicitation into the larger context of applied cognitive psychology it is necessary to understand its brief evolution. Some Background The push for expert systems in the 70's and 80's was motivated by (1) the technological capability, (2) the growing specialization of the workforce and cognitive complexity of jobs (Howell & Cooke, 1989), (3) the interest in creating artificial intelligence in machines, and (4) rejection of alternative general problem solving approaches (Feigenbaum, 1989). Instead of relying on search strategies, this new form of machine intelligence was "knowledge-based" or powered by facts and rules. The realization that "knowledge is power," triggered a flurry of interest in knowledge, and particularly in its elicitation and representation (Feigenbaum, 1989). Meanwhile, Cooke-3 parallel developments in the psychology of problem solving were taking place. It was becoming clear that expert problem solving could not be attributed to strategy, as much as to domain-specific facts and rules (Glaser & Chi, 1988). With a new focus on knowledge, questions regarding knowledge elicitation became central to both applied and basic endeavors. How can knowledge be effectively elicited from an expert? Interestingly, the typical (or thought-to-be-typical) transfer of cognitive theory and principles to application did not hold here. Although the cognitive literature had addressed the issue of knowledge, the focus …