On the pragmatics of counterfactuals

Until recently, theirs was the standard theory. But von Fintel 2001 and Gillies 2007 present a problem for the standard semantics: they claim that it fails to explain the infelicity of certain sequences of counterfactuals, namely reverse Sobel sequences. Both von Fintel and Gillies propose alternative dynamic semantic theories that explain the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences, and argue that we should trade in the standard semantics of counterfactuals for theirs. I will argue that we can and should explain the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences without giving up the standard semantics. In §1, I present the Stalnaker-Lewis semantics. In §2, I introduce reverse Sobel sequences, outline the von Fintel and Gillies theories, and say how their theories predict the infelicity of reverse Sobel sequences. In §3, I give my own explanation of why reverse Sobel sequences are generally infelicitous. In §4, I argue that compared to the von Fintel and Gillies theories, my theory appeals to principles that are more independently motivated, and gives a better account of our judgments about sequences of counterfactuals. For instance, I argue that some reverse Sobel sequences are felicitous, and that