Infrastructure security games

Infrastructure security against possible attacks involves making decisions under uncertainty. This paper presents game theoretic models of the interaction between an adversary and a first responder in order to study problem of the security within a transportation infrastructure. The risk measure used is based on the consequence of an attack in terms of the number of people affected or the occupancy level of a critical infrastructure, e.g. stations, trains, subway cars, escalators, bridges, etc. The objective of the adversary is to inflict the maximum damage to a transportation network by selecting a set of nodes to attack, while the first responder (emergency management center) allocates resources (emergency personnel or personnel-hours) to the sites of interest in an attempt to find the hidden adversary. This paper considers both static and dynamic, in which the first responder is mobile, games. The unique equilibrium strategy This research has been supported by the Rutgers University TCC/FTA (Transportation Coordinating Council/ Federal Transit Administration) M. Baykal-Gürsoy is a faculty member in the Industrial and Systems Engineering Department, and affiliated with RUTCOR and CAIT, Rutgers University, 96 Frelinghuysen Rd, Piscataway, NJ 08854-801 E-mail: [email protected] Z. Duan is a Ph.D. candidate in the I&SE department, Rutgers University E-mail: [email protected] H. V. Poor is a faculty member in the Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ E-mail: [email protected] A. Garnaev is a faculty member in the Department of Computer Modelling and Multi-Processor Systems, Saint Petersburg State University, St Petersburg, Russia, E-mail: [email protected] October 2, 2013 DRAFT Infrastructure Security Games Baykal-Gürsoy et al. pair is given in closed form for the simple static game. For the dynamic game, the equilibrium for the first responder becomes the best patrol policy within the infrastructure. This model uses partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) in which the payoff functions depend on an exogenous people flow, and thus, are time varying. A numerical example illustrating the algorithm is presented to evaluate an equilibrium strategy pair.