Electoral Connections: The E®ects of the Personal Vote on Political Patronage, Bureaucracy and Legislation in Postwar Italy1

This paper examines the relationship between the legislature and the public administration in postwar Italy (understood as the period from about 1948 through 1994). Italian public administration is normally characterized as badly designed and ine±cient, and government performance is usually classed as poor. I argue by contrast that bureaucratic ine±ciency, excessive legislation, and widespread bureaucratic corruption were features of Italian public administration that were deliberately designed by legislators, and intended to enhance the reelection prospects for incumbents by providing them opportunities for extensive constituency service. The underlying incentives stemmed from the candidates' search for the personal vote, essential for retaining public o±ce. Di®erences in the laws regulating the ̄nancing of political campaigns explains why excessive bureaucratization in the Italian context also resulted in extensive political corruption. `For a country as prosperous as Italy', reports a standard textbook on postwar Italian politics, `the resulting quality of public services | education, health, social security, justice, transport | is exceptionally low'.1 Not surprisingly, public dissatisfaction with the national bureaucracy and with political performance more generally has traditionally run high in Italy, much higher than in other western European countries.2 Why has postwar Italian public administration and government performed so badly? This paper argues that Italian public administration performed comparatively poorly during the postwar era as a result of the deliberate behavior of parliamentary o±cials, who were concerned to enhance their own reelection prospects. `Bad government' provided reasons for members of parliament to o®er voters compensatory constituency services. It also enhanced the partisan political loyalty of civil servants, who were typically appointed on a patronage basis, by providing them extensive opportunities to engage in bureaucratic corruption. While the overall system that emerged was not itself planned, the interactions and behaviors that underpinned it were strategic and self-serving. This interpretation is an application and extension of a model of bad government originally elaborated with the United States in mind.3 It stands