Reaction Function Based Dynamic Location Modeling in Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot Competition
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چکیده
We formulate a dynamic facility location model for a rm locating on a discrete network. It is assumed that this locating rm will act as the leader rm in an industry characterized by Stackelberg leader-follower competition. The rms I competitors are assumed to act as Cournot rms and are each assumed to operate under the assumption of zero conjectural variation with respect to their I 1 Cournot competitors. Using sensitivity analysis of variational inequalities within a hierachical mathematical programming approach, we develop reaction function based dynamic models to optimize the Stackelberg rms location decision. In the second half of this paper, we use these models to illustrate through a numerical example the enhanced insights yielded by a reaction based, dynamic approach
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تاریخ انتشار 2006