Have We Vindicated the Motivational Unconscious Yet? A Conceptual Review

Motivationally unconscious (M-unconscious) states are unconscious states that can directly motivate a subject's behavior and whose unconscious character typically results from a form of repression. The basic argument for M-unconscious states claims that they provide the best explanation for some seemingly non-rational behaviors, like akrasia, impulsivity, or apparent self-deception. This basic argument has been challenged on theoretical, empirical, and conceptual grounds. Drawing on recent works on apparent self-deception and on the "cognitive unconscious" I assess those objections. I argue that (i) even if there is a good theoretical argument for its existence, (ii) most empirical vindications of the M-unconscious miss their target. (iii) As for the conceptual objections, they compel us to modify the classical picture of the M-unconscious. I conclude that M-unconscious states and processes must be affective states and processes that the subject really feels and experiences - and which are in this sense conscious - even though they are not, or not well, cognitively accessible to him. Dual-process psychology and the literature on cold-hot empathy gaps partly support the existence of such M-unconscious states.