New Developments in Sovereign Debt Restructuring
نویسندگان
چکیده
There have been about 190 debt exchanges since 1950. Is this too many or too few? Have countries restructured debts in a timely manner or have they delayed too much? Have delays been costly, are they avoidable? What has led countries to these difficult decisions? What have been the costs and what have been the benefits of debt restructuring? As the majority of cases have not led to protracted legal problems, can we conclude that the current system is working? Has debt restructuring solved the underlying economic problems in the countries concerned? Do answers to these questions suggest ways to improve the current system for debt restructuring?
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تاریخ انتشار 2013