Trading Favors
نویسنده
چکیده
There are many real life situations in which large groups of agents cooperate even though any particular pair of agents interacts only rarely with one another. For example, Granovetter (1974) analyzed how workers get matched to new jobs and showed that a majority of workers found new jobs through referrals provided by ’weak links’ with other agents (see Granovetter (1973)). Such a referral frequently involves agents with whom the recipient of the referral interacts only at a very low frequency. If interactions are analyzed in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game played between the sender and the recipient of a favor, the obvious question is how can cooperation be sustained when agents interact only infrequently. The existing literature has provided two possible answers to this question. For any population size, cooperation can be generally enforced if group punishments are available. In many settings, institutions have developed to help groups of agents aggregate information efficiently. An example are diamond traders who put up pictures of non-trustworthy individuals in trading rooms. Traders can then identify defectors easily and punish them by refusing to do further business with them. A related literature on indirect reciprocity has emphasized the importance of ’image scores’ in enforcing indirect reciprocity (see, for example, Nowak and Sigmund (1998)). If group punishments are not available and agents only have information about the outcomes of past personal encounters with other agents then cooperation can
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تاریخ انتشار 2001