Infinite Coordination Games
نویسنده
چکیده
We investigate the prescriptive power of sequential iterated admissibility in coordination games of the Gale-Stewart style, i.e., perfectinformation games of infinite duration with only two payoffs. We show that, on this kind of games, the procedure of eliminating weakly dominated strategies is independent of the elimination order and that, under maximal simultaneous elimination, the procedure converges after at most ω many stages.
منابع مشابه
Emerging coordination in infinite team Markov games
In this paper we address the problem of coordination in multi-agent sequential decision problems with infinite statespaces. We adopt a game theoretic formalism to describe the interaction of the multiple decision-makers and propose the novel approximate biased adaptive play algorithm. This algorithm is an extension of biased adaptive play to team Markov games defined over infinite state-spaces....
متن کاملCooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns
Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...
متن کاملStochastic Strategy Adjustment in Coordination Games
The paper explores a model of equilibrium selection in coordination games, where agents from an infinite population stochastically adjust their strategies to changes in their local environment. Instead of playing perturbed best-response, it is assumed that agents follow a rule of `switching to better strategies with higher probability'. This behavioral rule is related to bounded-rationality mod...
متن کاملSubgame Perfect Equilibria in Stage Games
It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-device in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-devices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies, then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
متن کاملOn Asynchronicity of Moves and Coordination∗
This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for play ultimately being absorbed in the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of the stage game, for every Markov perfect equilibrium. For players p...
متن کامل