Mechanism Design with Bilateral Contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
Suppose a principal cannot commit to a centralized grand-mechanism with all his privately informed agents but can only sign public bilateral contracts with each of them. The principal can manipulate what he learns by contracting with an agent when dealing with others. Introducing this possibility for manipulations may simplify significantly optimal mechanisms. It restores both the continuity of the principal’s and the agents’ payoffs and that of the optimal mechanism with respect to the information structure. Still, correlation remains useful to better extract the agents’ information rent. In private values contexts, a Revelation Principle with bilateral contracting identifies the set of implementable allocations by means of simple non-manipulability constraints. Equipped with this tool, we characterize optimal non-manipulable mechanisms in various environments.
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تاریخ انتشار 2007