Toward a model of consciousness: philosophical problems and questions guiding a way forward

In spite of millennia of introspection, research and debate, there is still no compelling evidence for any single model of consciousness (Dehaene & Changeux 2011). Nor is there agreement on how to define consciousness, what constitutes a rigorous model of consciousness, and what research methods are most appropriate or productive when investigating consciousness. Current science relies on biological models of brain function as metaphors for describing what consciousness does and cannot confirm postulated causal relationships between discrete functional brain states and specific characteristics or subjective “states” of consciousness. The absence of a strong conceptual framework for thinking about consciousness, together with intrinsic limitations of contemporary research methods and technologies, have resulted in numerous un-testable hypotheses concerning the general nature of consciousness and a paralyzing lack of consensus on research priorities and methods , despite the fact that “mind” and “brain” have supplanted genetics as the next great scientific challenge for the international community -see the Human Brain Project in the EU and the BRAIN Initiative in the US (http://www.nih.gov/science/brain). With the above circumstances in view the principal goal of this paper is to clearly describe and concisely review philosophical problems and questions that are important to consider when developing models and research methods pertaining to consciousness. Topics covered include the roles and limitations of paradigms in science and other epistemologies, the relevance of different levels of analysis for investigating natural phenomena including the special case of consciousness, and different understandings of causality. The integral relationship between the nature of consciousness and the ‘background’ structure of space-time is discussed. A concise review of strengths and limitations of popular models of consciousness shows that current scientific models are based on naïve materialist assumptions that cannot potentially explain all functional characteristics or states of consciousness. The concepts of ‘body-brain’ and ‘embodiment’ are explored with respect to consciousness. I argue that a complete systems model of consciousness cannot be attained in the context of current science using existing research methods and Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 2 technologies however limited models of consciousness are possible. The evidence for so-called ‘nonordinary’ characteristics or subjective states of consciousness including claims of psychic functioning is briefly reviewed and conceptual problems pertaining to deriving models of Psi are discussed. The paper concludes with questions aimed at reconciling contemporary models of consciousness with models that purport to explain so-called 'non-ordinary' states of consciousness, including claims of psychic functioning. Approaching consciousness—first philosophical steps Any rigorous discussion of consciousness must entail philosophical analysis to ensure that premises and arguments are both explicit and stated in clear language. When premises or arguments are not explicit or are phrased in vague jargon there is little hope for philosophically and scientifically rigorous dialogue slowing progress toward an adequate theory of consciousness. In order to derive an adequate and coherent model of consciousness capable of explaining ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological,’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ objective characteristics and subjective states (i.e, qualia), premises and arguments must be consistent and transparent throughout the work. There is disagreement on a single ‘best’ consensus definition of ‘consciousness’; thus disparate models of consciousness start from different premises, employ arguments with different logical forms, and have different conceptual and research goals. Depending on starting premises, disparate models lead to very different inferences with respect to satisfactorily “defining” consciousness. For example, the premise that consciousness is a specialized property of life and is possible only in relationship to certain kinds of complex living systems leads to very different kinds of models than the premise that consciousness exists in its own right as a ‘primary’ kind of phenomenon in the universe. It follows that attempts to define consciousness cannot be other than competing descriptions of premises about the kind of thing consciousness is or can be, what it is like to have such-and-such an experience, or what consciousness does, and how consciousness is related (or not) to life, matter and energy. Attempts to “define” consciousness are thus equivalent to statements about beliefs that certain premises are more valid than others—and not statements of fact. Proposed definitions of consciousness are often framed as descriptions of subjective states related to ‘what it is like’ to have ‘such and such’ an experience. Few definitions make claims about discrete mechanisms of action or attempt to distinguish between subjective experiences that are susceptible to empirical investigation and those that are not. In other words, the majority of ‘definitions’ of consciousness rely principally on conjecture about unsubstantiated mechanisms and constitute a priori metaphysical assumptions because they are not falsifiable using available empirical means. The problem of “defining” consciousness is related to the more general problem of establishing a typology of different models of consciousness with a view toward clearly stating the underlying premises of disparate perspectives and remarking on their respective strengths and limitations. In view of the above it is unlikely that a single consensus definition or ‘shared understanding’ of consciousness will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future (Gierer 2008). In spite of seemingly intractable philosophical problems encountered when attempting to define consciousness in general, it may be productive to explicitly state the premises underlying models that purport to describe or explain particular observable characteristics or subjective states of consciousness. I believe that investigating Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 3 particular or ‘limited’ characteristics or subjective states associated with consciousness in an open-minded multidisciplinary framework will invite systematic discussion and debate on various models and suggest important future research questions. Different ways of knowing—general considerations and implications for future science Science and alternative ‘ways of knowing’ rest on divergent assumptions about the nature of phenomenal reality. These differences reflect the incommensurability of paradigms embedded in contemporary science and alternative world views described by Kuhn in his seminal work Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1970). Science currently regards mainstream theories in physics, chemistry and biology as providing an adequate explanatory framework for consciousness, including ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological,’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ experiences such as claims of psychic functioning. However, contemporary science is only one of many theoretical domains in which consciousness may be rigorously investigated, yielding valuable insights. Other ways of knowing (i.e., epistemologies) that offer valid schemata for conceptualizing relationships between body-brain-environment and consciousness include quantum physics, complexity theory and emerging concepts in the life sciences, medicine and spirituality. Many ways of knowing do not endorse or rely on contemporary scientific models of space-time, matter, causality, energy and information, and claim that alternative epistemological lenses may yield more accurate and more complete understandings of consciousness than available in contemporary scientific discourse. For example, introspective analysis of the “quality” or “meaning” of unique highly subjective experiences may yield insights about the phenomenological nature of conscious experiences that are as valid as findings from advanced functional brain imaging research. Furthermore, alternative ways of knowing may examine conscious states or experiences resulting from dynamically interacting factors in the complex body-brain-environment system which may not be reducible to current scientific theories and the language of linear causality. Complexity theory and other emerging theories in physics and the life sciences that examine phenomena from the perspective of non-linear dynamics may ultimately provide more accurate and more complete explanatory models of life in general including the special case of living systems that exhibit the capacity for consciousness (Seth et al 2006; Bullmore & Sporns 2009). Diverging perspectives of contemporary science and alternative epistemologies suggest the need for conceptual bridges between disparate paradigms. A dialog based on such trans-paradigm ‘bridges’ may help resolve misunderstandings related to the ambiguities of language while also clarifying the nature of conceptual gaps between disparate ways of knowing about consciousness. Evolving paradigms and implications for consciousness research A paradigm is a conceptual framework or “way of knowing” that biases and filters how phenomena are observed and interpreted. Materialism is presently the dominant philosophical perspective of Western civilization and the received dogma embedded in the theories and methods of current science. Materialism is thus the (often implicit) perspective that underlies the conceptual framework of physics, biology, neuroscience and, by extension, consciousness research. All paradigms are in a continuous state of flux because emerging research findings and novel models transform ways of knowing about the world Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 4 on an on-going basis. In reciprocal fashion, the evolution of paradigms invites novel ideas about the nature of phenomena. Hundreds of years of conceptual evolution of the orthodox materialist paradigm have led to numerous models of consciousness whose propositions are congruent with the tenets of materialism including for example, different versions of functionalism (Van Gulick 2011). Recent decades have seen serious challenges to the conventional materialist paradigm by advances in the basic sciences including quantum mechanics, high energy physics, complexity theory and other domains. A new paradigm contributes to the explanatory power of science when it provides a more complete and more accurate picture of causes of phenomena or descriptions of relationships between phenomena. The evolution of paradigms will gradually transform contemporary science resulting in novel explanatory models of reality in general that will in turn lead to radical new models of life and consciousness. Accordingly, the findings of any particular research methodology used to examine objective ‘characteristics’ or subjective ‘qualia’ of consciousness do not explain consciousness so much as they reflect the limitations of the paradigm in which a question is asked. Emerging models not yet endorsed by science may provide important future research directions for examining the nature of consciousness per se, and help clarify complex relationships between particular characteristics or subjective experiences associated with consciousness and the dynamic system of body-brain-environment. Every model is adduced within the context of a particular paradigm and from the unique perspective of its author. Humans are embedded in a rich social, cultural and intellectual tapestry that shapes the way they perceive, reason and act. Therefore all models, including models pertaining to the nature of consciousness, are by definition biased and limited in that they necessarily reflect the specialized and limited knowledge, perspectives and beliefs embedded in the cultural-ideological milieu of the author. The rigor and relevance of a particular model reflect the capacity of its author to objectify or ‘step outside of’ the lived social, cultural and intellectual context in which the creative work is done together with his or her skill at accurately identifying biases and constraints imposed by the milieu. This is equivalent to stating that the quality of any model reflects the capacity of its author to be cognizant of his or her social and ideological milieu and the limitations of method in a way that is self-reflective, self-critical and value-neutral. The ‘way of knowing’ within which a particular phenomenon is approached prefigures the premises, model and method used to examine it, resulting in an inevitable self-reinforcing circularity between epistemology, method and findings. Making explicit both the epistemology and premises on which a particular paradigm is based will clarify assumptions about the nature of phenomena being investigated and suggest useful methods of investigation. A myriad ‘ways of knowing about’ are used to investigate a wide range of natural phenomena. Disparate ways of knowing employ various methodologies to investigate phenomena however all methodologies can be reduced to two general conceptual approaches: empirical methodologies that provide objective information about properties of phenomena including, principally, scientific method; and non-empirical methodologies that use subjective approaches to characterize the nature of experiences related to phenomena including intuitive ‘knowing,’ and a range of other non-rational approaches including spiritual and transpersonal approaches. While claims of ‘intuitive’ or ‘non-rational’ knowing do not rely on empirical verification of phenomena, such claims may be regarded as ‘stronger’ when supported by ‘objective’ findings. Scientific method is currently the dominant empirical methodology, however intuition is a widely used non-empirical methodology for ‘knowing about’ phenomena in disparate cultural contexts and spiritual Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 5 traditions. Asking questions about kinds of phenomena that can have existence (ontology) or about disparate ways of knowing about phenomena (epistemology) entails comparing advantages and limitations of disparate epistemological and ontological assumptions with respect to shared beliefs about their relative utility in adducing explanatory models. Thus it is important when investigating phenomena from the perspective of any particular paradigm (e.g., science, linguistics, A.I., theoretical physics, theology, philosophy, mysticism, etc) to clearly articulate the paradigm and methods used to investigate phenomena and adduce explanatory models. Widely endorsed scientific models are generally based on expert consensus on their merits with respect to their ability to adequately explain phenomena being investigated. The endpoint of any investigation is pre-figured and limited by the paradigm in which the question being asked is conceptualized because the paradigm determines the kind and quality of information that can potentially be obtained through inquiry. The models and methods that comprise contemporary science play a dominant role in financially more developed countries because the enormous social and economic benefits accrued from research ensure continuation of entrenched ideological and financial interests that directly benefit from scientific advances in developed world regions. In this way the dominance of scientific materialism as a paradigm and set of methods and the hegemony of world centers of geopolitical and financial power reciprocally reinforce one another on an on-going basis. General models of reality rest on core premises about phenomena:  that exist in ways described in the model  that do not exist but for which existence is metaphysically possible  that are related to particular phenomena being examined (including the special case of consciousness) As already noted, the paradigm within which a theorist or researcher thinks and writes biases and constrains his or her perspective, choice of research problems and methods used to investigate phenomena, and thus pre-figures legitimate interpretations of findings pertaining to causes or meanings of phenomena regarded as possible or plausible. Along these lines, it is widely accepted as dogma in current science that legitimate explanations of observable characteristics or functions of consciousness or reports of subjective experiences are those which follow from and are consistent with core premises of a general model of consciousness widely acknowledged as valid by an academic community of ‘expert’ researchers. Keeping in mind that agreement on valid interpretations of objective characteristics or subjective experiences associated with consciousness may vary widely between disparate paradigms, it follows that the particular paradigm within which a researcher investigates or thinks about consciousness influences what he or she may ultimately ‘discover’ through research and by extension, biases interpretations of the significance of findings. Along the same lines, the method selected for interpreting the significance of findings pertaining to a particular characteristic or function associated with consciousness or assigning ‘meaning’ to reports of subjective conscious experiences informs and biases understandings of phenomena related to consciousness regarded as valid interpretations. Following the argument, the capacity of any model to adequately characterize phenomena associated with a particular observable characteristic or subjective ‘quale’ of consciousness are related to the explanatory power of the research methodology derived within the context of that model which in turn (above) reflects core premises of the paradigm in which the model is embedded. In sum the particular paradigm that prefigures the way a researcher “sees” and interprets phenomena related to consciousness significantly Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 6 influences and constrains ‘findings’ that may be obtained using a particular research method and determines shared beliefs about valid ways to interpret the quality or relevance of findings and thus to assign significance to findings. Finally, different models of consciousness often rest on disparate (often implicit) models of causality which reflect divergent assumptions about the nature of causality in paradigms from which they are derived. A general model of consciousness and the paradigm within which a particular observable characteristic or subjective ‘quale’ of consciousness is understood or approached through experimental research are thus logically related and reciprocally reinforcing concepts. Three levels of philosophical analysis Regardless of particular kinds of phenomena being investigated, philosophical analysis takes place at 3 ‘levels’ with respect to verification of existence in general, verification of kinds of relationships between entities or processes that exist or potentially exist, and examination of the roles of fundamental entities or processes (i.e., whose existence has previously been established) in the particular phenomena being investigated in the context of a specified paradigm and a particular model. The first ‘level’ of analysis entails establishing a method for determining categories of phenomena that exist or potentially exist. Determinations of existence cannot be achieved using scientific method or other objective methods because premises about fundamental existence are by definition metaphysical propositions that cannot be verified but which reflect widely shared beliefs about the nature of existence and kinds of phenomena that can exist. Existence of any particular entity or process on its own side (ie, without reference to other phenomena or an ‘outside’ system) is not objectively verifiable however (some) properties of phenomena can be described in terms of human perception. The second ‘level’ involves analysis of fundamental or ‘ground’ phenomena including for example, space-time, matter and energy, in which particular phenomena under investigation are situated. This level of analysis often begins with examination of a general ‘theory of reality’ that may not be explicit in a model being investigated but which provides the ‘ground’ in which the phenomena under investigation are situated. The claim that certain general or ‘ground’ phenomena exist and make up the ‘world’ in which phenomena being investigated exist or for which existence is metaphysically possible, precedes and pre-figures claims of existence of particular phenomena that can be characterized only in relationship to the ‘ground’ or the ‘world’ in which they have existence. Most claims of existence of particular phenomena reflect widely shared beliefs about the truth of metaphysical propositions describing kinds of phenomena that exist or can exist. Such claims are highly problematic because the issue of non-verifiability remains as in the first level of analysis. The third ‘level’ of analysis of phenomena is different from the first two in that objective empirical tests—at least in some instances—can be used to determine properties of entities or processes that constitute necessary or sufficient conditions for the existence of particular phenomena including, for example, objective characteristics and subjective qualia associated with consciousness. Some claims about phenomena examined at the ‘third level’ of analysis are verifiable as either ‘true’ or ‘false.’ However, even in cases when findings support claims made in a hypothesis, confirmation of existence or of the nature of particular phenomena remains elusive because all claims about phenomena ultimately rest on nonverifiable metaphysical propositions. It follows from the above argument that even in cases where existence of phenomena can be empirically verified, the ontological status of phenomena ultimately rests on antecedent metaphysical propositions Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 7 that are, by definition, non-verifiable. Such non-verifiable metaphysical propositions about the nature of phenomenal reality on which all scientific theories are based are “pre-scientific’ assumptions in that they are by definition antecedent to the work of science (Boss 1994). In view of the intrinsic limitations of analysis with respect to verifying claims of existence it is germane to ask whether alternative ‘ways of knowing’ can be applied to analysis of phenomena yielding more complete or more adequate models complementing the explanatory power of science. Further, might such alternative epistemologies yield models that are more ‘elegant’ or more ‘useful’ compared to contemporary scientific models? Models of natural phenomena—philosophical starting points At the outset it is important to explicitly state premises that pre-figure, constrain or bias concepts used to build a model. As already noted, ‘pre-scientific’ premises are metaphysical propositions in that they do not rest on antecedent premises, and thus can neither be independently verified as true nor refuted as false. ‘Pre-scientific’ premises constitute the unstated core of all scientific thought and therefore, all scientific models. With the above in mind a prudent approach to building a model pertaining to natural phenomena in general may entail delineating core premises describing the dynamic attributes of the system at the broadest level possible, and assembling a coherent model on the basis of these core premises. My starting premise is that space-time is a priori necessary for existence of all ‘things” and “processes,” by extension all natural phenomena ‘exist’ (ie, ‘are situated’) in a background of space-time. By convention, ‘things’ are discrete entities or complex aggregates of discrete entities situated in spacetime, while processes are dynamic relationships between discrete things situated in space-time. My second premise is that the ‘thingness’ of any entity (by extension, the dynamic properties of relationships between any two or more ‘entities,’ ie, a ‘process’)—whether it is construed as an assemblage of particles, points in space-time, or a system of interacting particles or fields–is influenced by the properties of local space-time in which the particular entity or process exists or can potentially exist, and the properties of interactions between the entity or process and the local n-dimensional space-time in which it exists or can potentially exist. The ontological status of an entity or process (ie, the temporal extension of an entity or a relationship between any two or more entities) is thus premised on the ontological status of a ‘primitive’ space-time in which it is situated as well as the properties of relationships between the entity or process and other entities or processes in which the entity or process being evaluated is ‘enfolded’ forming a unique space-time manifold. My third premise is that reciprocal relationships exist between things or processes and space-time such that any entity or process is both characterized by properties of local space-time and, in reciprocal fashion, pre-figures or determines the properties of local space-time in which it is situated. Is a complete model of consciousness possible? Efforts to derive an complete model of consciousness capable of both accurately and adequately describing and explaining the broad range of characteristics, functions and subjective experiences associated with consciousness should ideally invite open-minded debate and inquiry from multiple perspectives including the formalisms of science, religion, spirituality and other epistemologies. The problem of reconciling disparate models of consciousness derived using diverse epistemologies is closely Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 8 related to the more general problem of trans-paradigm validation. Along these lines an important goal of interdisciplinary dialog on consciousness is to derive a general model that accommodates multi-level analysis of body-brain-environment examining the broad range of phenomena including quantumlevel events, biological processes related to ‘ordinary states,’ ‘pathological’ states (e.g., mental illness) and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ states such as transpersonal experiences and claims of psychic functioning. A methodology that allows multi-level analysis may help elucidate important relationships between entities or processes in the body-brain-environment system including quantum processes, molecular mechanisms, single neurons, neuronal circuits, the whole brain, and interactions that take place at disparate levels in body-brain-environment that bear on consciousness. A complete model of consciousness should be able to rigorously characterize QM-level properties of body-brainenvironment and reconcile these properties with physical or neurophysiological properties of the system at the levels of single neurons, complex neural circuits and networks of circuits. The problem of adducing a complete explanatory model of consciousness that addresses the above criteria, and is congruent with current science, entails selecting a methodology for comparing disparate objective characteristics or subjective experiences of consciousness using language that is acceptable to and accessable by both science and alternative epistemologies. The method used in theory building will a priori bias the logical structure of any future model of consciousness that is adduced from first philosophical or scientific principles, constrain its propositions, and frame its relevance (or lack thereof) to the task of developing testable hypotheses for evaluating mechanisms underlying ‘ordinary,’ ‘pathological,’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ conscious states or experiences. A complete model should ideally start from premises that are congruent with (at least some) premises of established scientific models of consciousness, as well as premises of general scientific models of space-time, matter, energy and information. This is true because the conceptual ‘ground’ of a complete model of consciousness is implicit in a model of cosmology which describes the nature of reality, places constraints on kinds of entities and processes that exist or can potentially exist, and delimits factors that may affect the evolution and functioning of complex living systems in which consciousness takes place or can potentially take place. Following the argument a broad conceptual ‘ground’ afforded by cosmology should provide the (explicit) framework in which any future systems model of consciousness is derived. Scientific models of consciousness are grounded in unexamined materialist assumptions Contemporary scientific models of consciousness reflect naïve reductionist assumptions about the nature of phenomena. For example, the assumption that conditions necessary and sufficient for consciousness can be empirically identified and correctly interpreted within the context of current science is equivalent to the belief that the nature of consciousness is reducible to classically described properties of matter and energy and contemporary models in neuroscience and psychology. Although many alternative explanatory models have been proposed, such ideas have had little or no influence on the direction of scientific inquiry. The result is that many theorists accept a priori what amount to naïve assumptions about the nature of phenomenal reality based on outdated or incomplete ideas in physics, neuroscience and psychology as constituting adequate explanatory models of consciousness. The philosophical biases that pre-figure current science suggest that naïve reductionist models may continue to be regarded as adequate explanations of consciousness barring a radical re-visioning of the core philosophical foundations of science. The reductionist framework imposed by current science on methods used to investigate consciousness presently excludes consideration of quantum-level processes or other postulated Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 9 non-classical phenomena because such phenomena are not verifiable using available technologies. Thus the current dogma limits contemporary scientific understandings of consciousness to naïve materialist assumptions while delaying progress toward models based on emerging research findings from physics and the life sciences that could potentially lead to novel understandings of mechanisms underlying both ‘normal’ and so-called ‘non-ordinary’ characteristics, functions and subjective states of consciousness. Materialist theories of consciousness are at the foundations of Western philosophical and scientific thinking. Reductionist models of consciousness equate consciousness with brain function and include identity theories and functionalism. Reductionist theories are monist in that they posit the existence of only one kind of thing, namely fundamental kinds of physical entities. Contemporary reductionist models are, by definition, physicalist in that they reduce all observable characteristics and subjective states of consciousness to currently knowable physical and biological phenomena. Functionalism and identity theories are physicalist models that posit an equivalence between particular mental events and identifiable physical brain processes. According to reductionist physicalist models, words describing mental events are merely descriptions or “names” of processes, and there is no separate kind of corresponding mental “thing” that has existence independently of or ‘outside of’ the known physical world (Livaditis 2007). Authors cite evidence from psychological or neurophysiological research when arguing for different physicalist models of consciousness. Some evidence has been advanced in support of different versions of identity theory or functionalism however neither model has been strongly substantiated by research. Models of consciousness that do not rely on current science often rest on dualist theories that posit the existence of two fundamentally irreducible kinds of phenomena—the mental (or spiritual) and the physical—which interact in complex ways. Starting with Descartes non-physicalist dualist models are inherently at odds with scientific physicalist models and are generally dismissed by science as a priori invalid. Because of the scientific bias against assumptions of a non-physicalist dualist nature of consciousness such models are seldom subjected to rigorous scientific inquiry. A challenging issue that must be addressed in any dualist model of consciousness is agency which refers to problems inherent in explaining interactions between the two fundamentally different kinds of things posited by dualism, namely physical and non-physical phenomena and further, explaining how postulated interactions manifest as characteristics or qualia of consciousness. Contemporary scientific monist physicalist models of consciousness avoid the problem of agency by positing the existence of only physical brain processes and their correspondence to empirically verifiable mental states. Exhibit 1 describes core propositions, strengths and limitations of the major contemporary models of consciousness. Journal of Nonlocality Vol III Nr 1, June 2014 ISSN: 2167-6283 10 Exhibit 1: Contemporary mainstream theories of consciousness Theory Core propositions Strengths Limitations