Revisiting the Problem of Belief Revision with Uncertain Evidence

On ‎T‎he Fractional Minimal Cost Flow Problem of a Belief Degree Based Uncertain Network‎

A fractional minimal cost flow problem under linear type belief degree based uncertainty is studied for the first time. This type of uncertainty is useful when no historical information of an uncertain event is available. The problem is crisped using an uncertain chance-constrained programming approach and its non-linear objective function is linearized by a variable changing approach. An illus...

Belief-Kinematics Jeffrey-s Rules in the Theory of Evidence

This paper studies the problem of revising beliefs using uncertain evidence in a framework where beliefs are represented by a belief function. We introduce two new Jeffrey’s rules for the revision based on two forms of belief kinematics, an evidence-theoretic counterpart of probability kinematics. Furthermore, we provide two distance measures for belief functions and show that the two belief ki...

Three Scenarios for the Revision of Epistemic States

This position paper discusses the difficulty of interpreting iterated belief revision in the scope of the existing literature. Axioms of iterated belief revision are often presented as extensions of the AGM axioms, upon receiving a sequence of inputs. More recent inputs are assumed to have priority over less recent ones. We argue that this view of iterated revision is at odds with the claim, ma...

Revisiting Radical Revision

Strategy Constrained by Cognitive Limits, and the Rationality of Belief-Revision Policies

Strategy is formally defined as a complete plan of action for every contingency in a game. Ideal agents can evaluate every contingency. But real people cannot do so, and require a belief-revision policy to guide their choices in unforeseen contingencies. The objects of belief-revision policies are beliefs, not strategies and acts. Thus, the rationality of belief-revision policies is subject to ...