Reputations and Economic Performances in Dictatorships
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that reputational effects may explain differences in economic performances of dictatorial or authoritarian governments. A good reputation convinces citizens that the dictator will exert high effort in economic performance. With replacement, a dictator exerts high effort only if its foregone rent is not too large. Without replacement, the dictator succeeds in convincing the citizens of its competence but may go “bad” subsequently. In contrast, electoral contest allows citizens to punish a government by imposing a high significant cost with their votes at the polls after any reduction in beliefs in the government’s competence. JEL Classifications: D72, O12, P16
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