An Efficiency Characterization of Plurality Social Choice on Simple Preference Domains
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider a model of social choice dealing with the problem of choosing a subset from a set of objects (e.g. candidate selection, membership, and qualification problems). Agents have trichotomous preferences for which objects are partitioned into three indifference classes, goods, bads, and nulls, or dichotomous preferences for which each object is either a good or a bad. We characterize plurality-like social choice rules on the basis of the three main axioms, known as Pareto efficiency, anonymity, and independence.
منابع مشابه
Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
We introduce a notion of conditionally decisive powers of which the exercise depends on social consent. Decisive powers, or the so-called libertarian rights, are examples and much weaker forms of powers are covered by our notion. We provide an axiomatic characterization of existence of a system of powers and its uniqueness as well as characterizations of various families of rules represented by...
متن کاملNotes on Social Choice Theory
Social choice theory is the study of how decisions are made collectively. It examines the idea that, for a given society, the preferences of individuals can be directly aggregated to reflect a quintessential “social preference.” An example of such a preference aggregation method is simple plurality rule, in which citizens vote for a candidate and the candidate winning the most votes is deemed s...
متن کاملInformational requirements of social choice rules to avoid the Condorcet loser: A characterization of the plurality with a runoff
I consider informational requirements of social choice rules satisfying anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, and efficiency, and never choosing the Condorcet loser. Depending on the number of agents and the number of alternatives, either the plurality rule or a plurality with a runoff is characterized. In some cases, the plurality rule is the most selective rule among the rules operating on the...
متن کاملOrking Apers Eries in Heoretical and Pplied Conomics
We introduce conditionally decisive rights of which the exercise depends on social consent. Decisive (or libertarian) rights by Sen (1970) is an example and much weaker forms of rights are covered by our notion, leaving more hope for escaping from the so-called paradox of Paretian liberal. Main results provide an axiomatic characterization for existence of a well-defined system of rights and it...
متن کاملThe Structure of Strategy-Proof Social Choice: General Characterization and Possibility Results on Median Spaces
We define a general notion of single-peaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of single-peaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the “multi-dimensionally singlepeaked” preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and unifying the existing literature, we s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2004