Type-Compatible Equilibria in Signalling Games∗

Online Appendix for ``Type-Compatible Equilibria in Signalling Games''

Separating equilibria in continuous signalling games.

Much of the literature on costly signalling theory concentrates on separating equilibria of continuous signalling games. At such equilibria, every signaller sends a distinct signal, and signal receivers are able to exactly infer the signaller's condition from the signal sent. In this paper, we introduce a vector-field solution method that simplifies the process of solving for separating equilib...

Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process we study extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica 61, 57–84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has s...

Learning and Equilibrium Refinements in Signalling Games∗

We propose two new signalling-game refinements that are microfounded in a model of patient Bayesian learning. Agents are born into player roles and play the signalling game against a random opponent each period. Inexperienced agents know their opponents’ payoff functions but not the prevailing distribution of opponents’ play. One refinement corresponds to an upper bound on the set of possible l...

Learning and Type Compatibility in Signalling Games∗

Equilibrium outcomes in signalling games can be very sensitive to the specification of how receivers interpret and thus respond to deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers....