Optimizing Department of Homeland Security Defense Investments: Applying Defender-Attacker (-Defender) Optimization To Terror Risk Assessment and Mitigation

نویسندگان

  • Gerald G. Brown
  • W. Matthew Carlyle
  • Kevin Wood
چکیده

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is investing billions of dollars to protect us from terrorist attacks and their expected damage (i.e., risk). We present prescriptive optimization models to guide these investments. Our primary goal is to recommend investments in a set of available defense options; each of these options can reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attack, or enable future mitigation actions for particular types of attack. Our models prescribe investments that minimize the maximum risk (i.e., expected damage) to which we are exposed. Our “Defend-Attack-Mitigate risk-minimization model” assumes that terrorist attackers will observe, and react to, any strategic defense investment on the scale required to protect our entire country. We also develop a more general tri-level “Defender-AttackerDefender risk-minimization model” in which (a) the defender invests strategically in interdiction and/or mitigation options (for example, by inoculating health-care workers, or stockpiling a mix of emergency vaccines) (b) the attacker observes those investments and attacks as effectively as possible, and (c) the defender then optimally deploys the mitigation options that his investments have enabled. We show with simple numerical examples some of the important insights offered by such analysis. As a byproduct of our analysis we elicit the optimal attacker behavior that would follow our chosen defensive investment, and therefore we can focus intelligence collection on telltales of the most-likely and most-lethal attacks.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Robust allocation of a defensive budget considering an attacker's private information.

Attackers' private information is one of the main issues in defensive resource allocation games in homeland security. The outcome of a defense resource allocation decision critically depends on the accuracy of estimations about the attacker's attributes. However, terrorists' goals may be unknown to the defender, necessitating robust decisions by the defender. This article develops a robust-opti...

متن کامل

Adaptive Attacker Strategy Development Against Moving Target Cyber Defenses

A model of strategy formulation is used to study how an adaptive attacker learns to overcome a moving target cyber defense. The attacker-defender interaction is modeled as a game in which a defender deploys a temporal platform migration defense. Against this defense, a population of attackers develop strategies specifying the temporal ordering of resource investments that bring targeted zero-da...

متن کامل

Intelligent adversary risk analysis: a bioterrorism risk management model.

The tragic events of 9/11 and the concerns about the potential for a terrorist or hostile state attack with weapons of mass destruction have led to an increased emphasis on risk analysis for homeland security. Uncertain hazards (natural and engineering) have been successfully analyzed using probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Unlike uncertain hazards, terrorists and hostile states are intelligen...

متن کامل

Secrecy and Deception in Anti-Terrorism Resource Allocation and Policy Implication

In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model for whether and what a defender should disclose about her resource allocation in the homeland-security context. Our model allows us to explore whether the defender should disclose correct information about her defensive resource allocation (truthful disclosure), incorrect information (deception), or no information (secrecy). In the case where onl...

متن کامل

Strategic Games on Defense Trees

In this paper we use defense trees, an extension of attack trees with countermeasures, to represent attack scenarios and game theory to detect the most promising actions attacker and defender. On one side the attacker wants to break the system (with as little efforts as possible), on the opposite side the defender want to protect it (sustaining the minimum cost). As utility function for the att...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2008