Speciesism Revisited

Do human non-persons have basic rights simply because they are members of a species characterized by personhood? Are we justified if we give IIDral preference to human non-persons over non-human non-persons with equivalent mental capacities, provided that the latter do not belong to a species characterized by personhood? Michael Wreen has argued for this speciesist view in his recent, important article, "In Defense of Speciesism. "[ I] I have very recently argued that he fails to make a case for his view. [2] Now Wreen has forcefully rejected my criticisms in his "My Kind of Person." [3] In the present article, I am pleased. to contribute another installment to the debate on speciesism. This issue, which is central not only to anirral rights issues but also to ethics in general, certainly needs IIDre critical attention. Wreen is one of the very few IbilosoIbers who has put his keen fbilosofbical acumen to the task of defending a view taken for granted by virtually all humans. When the current round of argumentative dust has settled, however, I believe that the reader will agree that speciesism remains unjustified.