CeGE - Discussion Paper 21 Helmut Bester Kai Konrad
نویسندگان
چکیده
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.
منابع مشابه
Easy targets and the timing of conflict
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target.
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متن کاملResearch Area Markets and Political Economy Research Unit Market Processes and Governance Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt Und Politische Ökonomie Abteilung Marktprozesse Und Steuerung Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict
Contestants have to choose whether to initiate a contest or war, or whether to remain peaceful for another period. We find that agents wait and initiate the contest once their rival is sufficiently weak to be an easy target. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG ''Leichte Beute'' und der Zeitpunkt eines Konflikts Die Gegner in einem potentiellen Konflikt müssen sich in jeder Periode entscheiden, ob sie den Konflikt ...
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Inverse Campaigning It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipa...
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تاریخ انتشار 2003