An Automated Analysis of the Security of Quantum Key Distribution

This paper discusses the use of computer–aided verification as a practical means for analysing quantum information systems; specifically, the BB84 protocol for quantum key distribution is examined using this method. This protocol has been shown to be unconditionally secure against all attacks in an information–theoretic setting, but the relevant security proof requires a thorough understanding of the formalism of quantum mechanics and is not easily adaptable to practical scenarios. Our approach is based on probabilistic model–checking; we have used the PRISM model–checker to show that, as the number of qubits transmitted in BB84 is increased, the equivocation of the eavesdropper with respect to the channel decreases exponentially. We have also shown that the probability of detecting the presence of an eavesdropper increases exponentially with the number of qubits. The results presented here are a testament to the effectiveness of the model–checking approach for systems where analytical solutions may not be possible or plausible.