Imperfect Information and Optimal Monetary Policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
Should the central bank care whether slow adjustment of the price level is due to adjustment costs as in the standard New Keynesian model or due to imperfect information? Most of the analysis of optimal monetary policy is conducted in the Calvo model. This paper studies optimal monetary policy in a model with exogenous dispersed information and in a rational inattention model. JEL: E3, E5, D8.
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تاریخ انتشار 2010