Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty
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چکیده
We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of specific mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems.
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تاریخ انتشار 2002