Computation of Equilibria in Noncooperative Games
نویسنده
چکیده
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N 1.1. T h e E q u i l i b r i u m P r o b l e m in C l a s s i c a l G a m e T h e o r y In recent years, t he re has b e e n a p ro l i fe ra t ion of app l ica t ions of n o n c o o p e r a t i v e g a m e t h e o r y t o economics~ pol i t ica l science, evo lu t i ona ry biology, and o the r disciplines. A typ ica l research *Supported by DARPA/ARO Contract DAAL03-88-K-0195, DARPA/ISTO Contract N00014-88-K-0458, Office of Naval Research under contract N00014-87-K-0310, and Air Force contract AFSO1~87-0386. Also Supported by Duke University's James B. Duke Fellowship for Advanced Studies. tSupported by NSF Grants MCS-8120790 and SES-8420114. ~Supported by DARPA/ARO Contract DAAL03-88-K-0195, DARPA/ISTO Contract N00014-88-K-0458, OffÉce of Naval Research under contract N00014-87-K-0310, and Air Force contract AFSOR-87-0386. Also, subsequently supported by National Science Foundation Grants CCF-0523555, CCF-0432038, CCF-0432047, ITR-03261573 EIA-0218376, EIA-0218359, and EIA-0086015. 0898-1221/05/$ see front matter (~) 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Typeset by ,4.~¢b-q-TEX doi:10.1016/j.camwa.2005.02.015
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تاریخ انتشار 2005