Written and Produced by Galois the Future of Voting End - to - End Verifiable Internet Voting Specification and Feasibility Assessment Study

INTRODUCTION Societies have conducted elections for thousands of years, but technologies used to cast and tally votes have varied and evolved tremendously over that time. In 2015 many of our essential services have moved online, and some people want elections to follow this trend. Overseas voters are particularly interested in an online approach, as their voting processes can require additional effort and suffer from long delays. Internet voting systems currently exist, but independent auditing has shown that these systems do not have the level of security and transparency needed for mainstream elections. Security experts advise that end-to-end verifiability—lacking in current systems—is one of the critical features needed to guarantee the integrity, openness, and transparency of election systems. In this report, we examine the future of voting and the possibility of conducting secure elections online. Specifically, we explore whether End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting (E2E-VIV) systems are a viable and responsible alternative to traditional election systems. This project combines the experience and knowledge of a diverse group of experts committed to election integrity. The technical team, comprised of academic and scientific specialists, has long term, proven experience in end-to-end verifiable systems, cryptography, high-assurance systems development, usability, and testing. Internet voting was first proposed over thirty years ago. Since then, many governments and businesses have created Internet voting technologies that have been used to collect millions of votes in public elections. However, computer scientists, cryptographers , and cybersecurity experts warn that no current Internet voting system is sufficiently secure and reliable for use in public elections. Part of the problem is that existing systems do not allow third parties to observe the election system and independently verify that the results are correct. In fact, most vendors explicitly forbid such oversight. SECRET No existing commercial Internet voting system is open to public review. Independent parties cannot verify that these systems function and count correctly, nor can they audit and verify election results. INSECURE Elections for public office are a matter of national security. Researchers have shown that every publicly audited, commercial Internet voting system to date is fundamentally insecure. No existing system guarantees voter privacy or the correct election outcomes. Election vendors are rarely held liable for security failures or election disasters.