Self-enforcing Democracy

Democracy endures only if it self-enforcing. It is not a contract because there are no third parties to enforce it. To survive, democracy must be an equilibrium at least for those political forces which can overthrow it: given that others respect democracy, each must prefer it over the feasible alternatives. Without getting mired in de...nitional discussions, here is how democracy works: (for a fuller account, see Przeworski 1991, Chapter 1): (1) Interests or values are in con‡ict. If they were not, if interests were harmonious or values were unanimously shared, anyone’s decisions would be accepted by all, so that anyone could be a benevolent dictator. (2) The authorization to rule is derived from elections. (3) Elections designate ”winners” and ”losers.” This designation is an instruction to the participants as to what they should and should not do. Democracy is an equilibrium when winners and losers obey the instructions inherent in their designations. (4) Democracy functions under a system of rules. Some rules, notably those that map the results of elections on the designations of winners and losers, say the majority rule, are ”constitutive” in these sense of Searle (1995), that is, they enable behaviors that would not be possible without them. But most rules emerge in equilibrium: they are but descriptions of equilibrium strategies. Most importantly, I argue below, under democracy governments are moderate not because they are constrained by exogenous, constitutional, rules but because they must anticipate sanctions were their actions more extreme. My purpose is to examine conditions under which such a system