Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We propose two related equilibrium re nements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make o¤ers to several players. We establish existence of these equilibria in nite and in nite (for MTHPE) games, provide a characterization of the structure of equilibria, and clarify the relationship between the two concepts. Finally, we show how these concepts can be applied in a dynamic model of endogenous club formation. Keywords: voting, agenda-setting games, Markov trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. JEL Classi cation: D72, C73. Daron Acemoglu gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the National Science Foundation.
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic
We propose two related equilibrium refinements for voting and agenda-setting games, Sequentially Weakly Undominated Equilibrium (SWUE) and Markov Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium (MTHPE), and show how these equilibrium concepts eliminate non-intuitive equilibria that arise naturally in dynamic voting games and games in which random or deterministic sequences of agenda-setters make offers to s...
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