A Failure of Representative Democracy∗

We compare direct democracy, in which members of a population cast votes for alternatives as choice problems arrive, and representative democracy, in which a population elects a candidate whose ordering of alternatives serves as a binding, contingent plan of action for future choice problems. While direct democracy is normatively appealing, representative democracy has practical advantages and is the more common institution. The key question, then, is whether representative democracy can successfully implement the choices that would be made under direct democracy. We perform a best case analysis, constructing models of direct and representative democracy that are as similar as possible and considering only those populations where majority rule over alternatives is consistent with an ordering. We show that even in this best case, where the normative recommendation of direct democracy is clear, representative democracy may not select the ordering consistent with majority rule over alternatives. Finally, we propose a population restriction that serves as a sufficient condition for consistency between direct and representative democracy. ∗A special thank you to Jerry Green for many helpful conversations about this work. This author also gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of Drew Fudenberg, Alvin Roth, Kenneth Shepsle, and several seminar participants at New York University and Harvard University.