5 Physicalism , Chaos and Reductionism
نویسنده
چکیده
In addition to ignoring the severe practical problems posed by decoherence phenomena, quantum mind hypotheses are motivated by a misunderstanding of the nature of classical (i. e. nonquantum) dynamics. As presently understood, nonlinear dynamical systems – of which the brain is clearly one – exhibit the twin phenomena of chaos and emergence. The first of these impedes reductionist formulations as does quantum theory, and the second leads to hierarchical structures in biological organisms and cognitive systems, which are difficult to analyze reductively. Thus a quantum mind theory must rest on empirical evidence rather than philosophical speculation.
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تاریخ انتشار 2006