Comparative Statics, Stability, and Uniqueness
نویسنده
چکیده
Consider an economic model whose equilibrium can be represented as the xed point of a system of di¤erentiable equations. Using the theory ofB matrices, I show that comparative statics are well-behaved if the interactions between the equations are not too large, and the negative interactions are not too varied. When there are only positive interactions, for example when strategic complements prevail in a strategic setting, I prove a version of Samulesons (1947) Correspondence Principle in that equilibrium is nondecreasing for any positive parameter shock if and only if equilibrium is exponentially stable under discrete time best reply dynamics. If there are only negative interactions, like when strategic substitutes prevail in a game theoretic context, I use the theory of inverse M matrices to signi cantly relax Dixits (1986) conditions under which comparative statics are well-behaved. For every comparative statics result I show that if the conditions apply globally then equilibrium is unique. Applications are provided to di¤erentiated products Cournot oligopoly, market demand with interdependent preferences, and games on xed networks. Keywords: Correspondence Principle, Interdependent Preferences, Oligopoly, Networks, M -matrices, inverse M -matrices, B-matrices, P matrices, global univalence JEL Classi cation: D11 [email protected]
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تاریخ انتشار 2015