Tiny Systematic Vote Manipulations Can Swing Elections

نویسندگان

  • Anthony Di Franco
  • Andrew Petro
  • Emmett Shear
  • Vladimir Vladimirov
چکیده

We examine the effects of a type of electoral fraud easily perpetrated by someone with access to the system software for a direct-recording electronic voting system. The hypothetical attacker modifies the software to arbitrarily change a small number of votes on each voting machine. We determine the effect of this manipulation on the electoral college results of the 2000 United States Presidential election. We conclude that changing only a single vote per electronic voting machine can change the outcome of the election.

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تاریخ انتشار 2004