Interventions in Premise Semantics
نویسنده
چکیده
Counterfactual thought and talk play a central role throughout science and in many areas of philosophy. Hence it’s not surprising that they have been extensively studied in a number fields: besides philosophy itself, linguistics, psychology, and computer science. In particular, much work has gone into developing a logic and a semantics for counterfactual conditionals, i.e. conditionals of the form:
منابع مشابه
Filtering semantics for counterfactuals: Bridging causal models
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تاریخ انتشار 2015