An Anytime Algorithm for Finding the ?-Core in Nontransferable Utility Coalitional Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We provide the first anytime algorithm for finding the -core in a nontransferable utility coalitional game. For a given set of possible joint actions, our algorithm calculates , the maximum utility any agent could gain by deviating from this set of actions. If is too high, our algorithm searches for a subset of the joint actions which leads to a smaller . Simulations show our algorithm is more efficient than an exhaustive search by up to 2 orders of magnitude.
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تاریخ انتشار 2012