1 Introduction Perception , Causation , and Objectivity

Perceptual experience, that paradigm of subjectivity, constitutes our most immediate and fundamental access to the objective world. At least, this would seem to be so if commonsense realism is correct—if perceptual experience is (in general) an immediate awareness of mind-independent objects, and a source of direct knowledge of what such objects are like. Commonsense realism raises many questions. First, can we be more precise about its commitments? Does it entail any particular conception of the nature of perceptual experience and its relation to perceived objects, or any particular view of the way perception yields knowledge? Second, what explains the apparent intuitive appeal of commonsense realism? Should we think of it as a kind of folk theory held by most human adults or is there a sense in which we are pre-theoretically committed to it—in virtue of the experience we enjoy or in virtue of the concepts we use or in virtue of the explanations we give? Third, is commonsense realism defensible, in the face of formidable challenges from epistemology, metaphysics, and cognitive science? The project of the present volume is to advance our understanding of these issues and thus to shed light on the commitments and credentials of common-sense realism. As you may have guessed from the title, the volume also aims to highlight the pivotal role the concept of causation plays in these debates. Central issues to be addressed include the status and nature of causal requirements on perception, the causal role of perceptual experience, and the relation between objective perception and causal thinking—issues that, as many chapters in the volume bring out, are inseparable from concerns with the very nature of causation. The chapters in this volume explore commonsense realism from a range of perspectives. The psychological essays are concerned with the development, phylogenetic and ontogenetic, of the human adult conception of perception. Some of the philosophical essays are mainly concerned with the explanatory role of perceptual experience—its role in explaining our possession of knowledge, and concepts, of mind-independent objects, and our grasp of the very idea of objectivity. Others focus on issues concerning