Classifications of Symmetric Normal Form Games
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper we survey various classifications of symmetric games and their characterisations under the theme of fairness; show that game bijections and game isomorphisms form groupoids; introduce matchings as a convenient characterisation of strategy triviality; and outline how to construct and partially order parameterised symmetric games with numerous examples that range over various classes.
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عنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1311.4766 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013