Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identi…ed by Baigent (1987) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak pareto condition is imposed. Hence, under weak independence, both the Arrow (1951) and Wilson (1972) theorems vanish. We thank Goksel Asan, Irem Bozbay, Tugce Cuhadaroglu, Gilbert La¤ond, Jean Laine, Ipek Ozkal-Sanver and Ozer Selcuk for their constructive suggestions. Our research is part of a project entitled “Social Perception A Social Choice Perspective”, supported by Istanbul Bilgi University Research Fund. Remzi Sanver acknowledges the support of the Turkish Academy of Sciences Distinguished Young Scientist Award Program (TUBAGEBIP). Of course, the authors are responsible from all possible errors.