Price Updating in Combinatorial Auctions for Coordination of Manufacturing Multiagent Systems

نویسندگان

  • Juan José Lavios Villahoz
  • Ricardo del Olmo Martínez
  • José Alberto Araúzo Araúzo
  • José Manuel Galán
چکیده

In this work we use the paradigm of multiagent systems to solve the Job Shop problem. Job Shop problem is a particular problem of scheduling in which we try to find an schedule that optimize a objective and is subject to certain constraints. We propose a combinatorial auction mechanism to coordinate agents. The “items” to be sold are the time slots that we divide the time horizon into. In tasks scheduling problems tasks need a combination of time slots of multiple resources to do the operations. The use of auctions in which different valuations of interdependent items are considered (e.g. combinatorial auctions) is necessary. A certain time slot will be more valuated to the extent that it enables task to finish the job on time, together with the other time slot bought. Job-agents are pricetakers in the model. The auctioneer fixes prices comparing the demand over a time slot of a resource with the capacity of the resource in this time slot. There are many ways to update prices (e.g. constant increase or decrease of prices, proportional to the demand, proportional to the excess of demand). Our objective is to compare the different methods of updating prices based on those of the lagrangian relaxation solving method.

برای دانلود رایگان متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Price-Setting Combinatorial Auctions for Coordination and Control of Manufacturing Multiagent Systems: Updating Prices Methods

Combinatorial auctions are used as a distributed coordination mechanism in Multiagent Systems. The use of combinatorial auctions as negotiation and coordination mechanism is especially appropriate in systems with interdependencies and complementarities such as manufacturing scheduling systems. In this work we review some updating price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions based on the Lagrangi...

متن کامل

Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions using Hybrid Ant Colony Optimization and Multi-Neighborhood Local Search

A combinatorial auction is an auction where the bidders have the choice to bid on bundles of items. The WDP in combinatorial auctions is the problem of finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue under the constraint that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. The WDP is known as an NP-hard problem with practical applications like electronic commerce, production manag...

متن کامل

Coordination of Pricing, Ordering, and Lead time Decisions in a Manufacturing Supply Chain

In this paper, an incentive policy is proposed to coordinate ordering, lead time, and pricing strategies in a two-echelon manufacturing supply chain (SC) consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The system is faced with a stochastic demand which depends on both price and lead time. The manufacturer decides on production size and manufacturing acceleration rate while the retailer determi...

متن کامل

Integrated production-Inventory model with price-dependent demand, imperfect quality, and investment in quality and inspection

In practice, manufacturing systems are never perfect and may have low quality outputs. Therefore, different decisions such as reprocessing, sale at lower prices or diminishing are made according to industry and market. This paper investigates the importance of supply chain coordination through developing two models in centralized decision-making for an imperfect quality manufacturing system wit...

متن کامل

Coherent Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies

Auctions and exchanges are important coordination mechanisms for multiagent systems. Most multi-good markets are combinatorial in that the agents have preferences over bundles of goods. We study the possibility of determining prices so as to support (efficient) allocations in combinatorial economies where a seller (or arbitrator) wants to implement an efficient allocation. Conditions on the exi...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010