The Evolutionary Basis of Collective Action

Many aspects of political behavior have been illuminated by standard models in which political actors maximize self-interested preferences. The works of Downs (1957), Buchanan and Tullock (1962),Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980) and Becker (1983), as well as those inspired by these seminal contributions, have contributed to our understanding of voter, party and policy preferences, interest group politics, rent-seeking, coalition formation, bargaining and other aspects of political behavior. Using this framework, works on electoral support for the welfare state (Benabou and Ok 2001, Moene and Wallerstein 2002), informal enforcement of contracts (Greif 1994, Greif, Milgrom and Weingast 1994), the efficiency of democratic governance (Wittman 1989), nationalism (Breton, Galeotti, Salmon and Wintrobe 1995) and ethnic conflict (Varshney 2003) have produced important and sometimes surprising insights. Yet as Ostrom (1998) and others have pointed out, a number of critical aspects of political behavior remain difficult to explain within this framework. These include the fact that people bother to vote at all, and electoral support for costly redistributive programs from which the voter concerned is unlikely to benefit and for which he will certainly pay additional taxes (Luttmer 2001, Fong 2001, Fong, Bowles and Gintis 2005), and many forms of political violence (Stern 2003). Among the more striking examples of the shortcomings of the standard model is the large class of political behavior that takes the form of voluntary contribution to public goods. Included is participation in joint political activities and other forms of collective ∗Affiliations: Bowles, University of Siena and Santa Fe Institute; Gintis: Santa Fe Institute and Central European University, Budapest. We would like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Behavioral Sciences Program of the Santa Fe Institute for financial support.