Quality Competition and Entry Deterrence: When to Launch an Extra Brand

نویسندگان

  • Stephan Müller
  • Georg Götz
چکیده

In this paper, we study the rational for an incumbent to launch a second brand when facing potential entry in a market with quality differentiated products and a fringe producer. Depending on market size, costs for a second brand and a potential entrant’s setup cost the incumbent might use a second brand both when deterring and when accommodating entry. The analysis generates predictions about the equilibrium degree of product differentiation, the presence of a multiproduct incumbent, and the determinants of successful entry.

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تاریخ انتشار 2014