Optimal unemployment insurance: When search takes effort and money ¬リニ
نویسنده
چکیده
• I develop a model where finding work requires effort and monetary expenses. • The model assumes search effort, savings, and search capital are hidden actions. • I use the model to determine the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) policy. • Without savings high upfront benefits is optimal so search expenses are affordable. • With savings UI should be high for the long-term unemployed. a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o Searching for work is costly. It involves finding available positions, completing applications, and attending interviews , to name but a few of the activities involved. The optimal unemployment insurance (UI) literature models the cost of these activities as either a reduction in leisure or an unpleasant bad that reduces utility, ignoring their associated monetary costs. If search requires out of pocket expenses on goods and services that improve the probability of a successful job search, a low UI benefit may make a job search unaffordable. This paper investigates the optimal structure of UI in an economy where job search is not only unpleasant, but also requires a monetary investment. Numerical experiments suggest that without access to capital markets, the optimal UI system should include a higher benefit for the newly unemployed than is implied by assuming a job search is free. This allows workers to purchase the stock of goods and services needed to find work. In contrast, when workers can accumulate savings, more benefits should be provided to the long-term unemployed, so they have the financial resources needed to conduct a job search even as they exhaust their own savings. Searching for work is a costly endeavor. The process involves a set of fairly unpleasant activities, such as searching through help wanted advertisements , preparing resumes and applications, and attending interviews. Modelers interested in the search process, and in particular the optimal design of unemployment insurance (UI), incorporate these costs as either a loss of leisure time or an intangible bad that reduces utility. To date, the literature largely ignores the out of pocket expenses that are required to perform a search. A job search not only requires some intangible effort, but a variety of goods and services ranging from transportation and professional attire for interviews to computing resources and paid recruiters. The degree to which monetary expenses are important to the job hunt raises a variety …
منابع مشابه
Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Matching Equilibrium: The Role of Congestion and Thick-Market Externalities
This paper characterises optimal unemployment insurance (UI) and optimal tax policy in an equilibrium matching framework where job search effort is unobserved by the Planner. Policy design takes into account congestion externalities (greater job search effort by an individual worker reduces the re-employment rate of other competing job seekers) and thick market externalities (greater job creati...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Effort
In the framework of a search and matching model, when search effort enters the labor market matching function, search effort by one worker generates a negative externality on other workers searching for jobs. The solution to the social planner’s problem may not be decentralized in a competitive market. Calibration shows that the current US unemployment insurance (UI) system generates an 8.07% w...
متن کاملVerification of unemployment benefits’ claims using Classifier Combination method
Unemployment insurance is one of the most popular insurance types in the modern world. The Social Security Organization is responsible for checking the unemployment benefits of individuals supported by unemployment insurance. Hand-crafted evaluation of unemployment claims requires a big deal of time and money. Data mining and machine learning as two efficient tools for data analysis can assist ...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance in Search Equilibrium
Should unemployment benefits be paid indefinitely at a fixed rate or should it decline (or increase) over a worker’s unemployment spell? We examine these issues using an equilibrium model of search unemployment. The model features worker-firm bargaining over wages, free entry of new jobs, and endogenous search effort among the unemployed. The main result is that an optimal insurance program imp...
متن کاملOptimal Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Search Effort and Endogenous Savings∗
After first reviewing recent results on optimal unemployment insurance (UI) with unobserved search effort and hidden savings, this paper identifies that lump sum layoff payments play an important role. Simulations find that coordinating constant UI paid to the unemployed, with a severance payment that fully compensates for the drop in permanent income by being laid-off yields payoffs which are ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015