A Defense of the Deprivation Argument

Some believe that abortion is wrong because it harms the fetus by depriving it of its future. Dean Stretton rejects his argument. He claims that the harm of death is not a sufficient source of the right to life and that, even if it were, a fetus cannot be seriously harmed by being deprived of its future. In this article I critically assess Stretton’s arguments for each of these claims and find these arguments problematic. In doing so, I believe that I successfully defend against Stretton’s attack the initial plausibility of the deprivation argument. N OT TOO LONG AGO Don Marquis offered what has come to be known as “the deprivation argument” against abortion. The 1 argument is rather uncomplicated. Using “FLO” to stand for “future like ours,” Marquis reasons as follows: “Deprivation of an FLO explains why killing adults and children is wrong. Abortion deprives fetuses of FLOs. Therefore, abortion is wrong.” There is a great deal of 2 plausibility to this argument. I look upon being deprived of my future as a significant harm, and I think that others ought not do that to me. Now since a fetus also has a future, and a future like mine, isn’t it similarly harmful to kill it? Ought that not be done to it? Recently, Dean Stretton challenged the deprivation argument by proposing that “the serious harm of death is not a sufficient source of the right to life...” and that, even if it were, the fetus “cannot be seriously 260 Life and Learning XVI Dean Stretton, “The Deprivation Argument Against Abortion,” Bioethics 18/2 3