2 Examples of Bayesian Games 2 . 1 A Two Player Bargaining
نویسنده
چکیده
Note: This is a only a draft version, so there could be flaws. If you find any errors, please do send email to [email protected]. A more thorough version would be available soon in this space. We have so far studied strategic form games with complete information. We will now study games with incomplete information, which are crucial to the theory of mechanism design. In particular, we study Bayesian games and introduce different equilibrium notions in Bayesian games such as Bayesian Nash equilibrium. A game with incomplete information is one in which, at the first point in time when the players can begin to plan their moves in the game, some players have private information about the game that other players do not know. In contrast, in complete information games, there is no such private information, and all information is publicly known to everybody. Clearly, incomplete information games are more realistic, more practical. The initial private information that a player has, just before making a move in the game, is called the type of the player. For example, in an auction involving a single indivisible item, each player would have a valuation for the item, and typically the player himself would know this valuation deterministically while the other players may only have a guess about how much this player values the item. John Harsanyi (Joint Nobel Prize winner in Economic Sciences in 1994 with John Nash and Rein-hard Selten) proposed in 1968, Bayesian form games to represent games with incomplete information.
منابع مشابه
Transfer of Bargaining Power Sources in Oil Trade Games
Bargaining Power is one of the important issues in oil trade negotiations. In this paper two effective factors in bargaining power i.e. patient time to deal and outside options of each player have been considered. The necessary relations for exchange of sources in negotiation have been derived.
متن کاملMath 121 — Game Theory Review
1. Definitions 2 1.1. Non-cooperative Games 2 1.2. Cooperative 2-person Games 4 1.3. Cooperative n-person Games (in coalitional form) 6 2. Theorems and Main Ideas 7 3. Techniques 8 3.1. Tips to remember when solving 2-player 0-sum games: 8 3.2. Solving for mixed strategies in 2-player 0-sum games: 8 3.3. Finding equilibrium pairs in 2-person nonzero-sum games 9 3.4. Finding the Nash maximin bar...
متن کاملLarge Repeated Games with Uncertain Fundamentals I: Compressed Equilibrium
Due to their many applications, large Bayesian games have been a subject of growing interest in game theory and related fields. But to a large extent, models (1) have been restricted to one-shot interaction, (2) are based on an assumption that player types are independent, and (3) assume that the number of players is known. The current paper develops a general theory of repeated large Bayesian ...
متن کاملRobust Opponent Modeling in Real-Time Strategy Games using Bayesian Networks
Opponent modeling is a key challenge in Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games as the environment is adversarial in these games, and the player cannot predict the future actions of her opponent. Additionally, the environment is partially observable due to the fog of war. In this paper, we propose an opponent model which is robust to the observation noise existing due to the fog of war. In order to cope...
متن کاملBargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts1
Consider a two-person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and o¤ers each period and collect payo¤s (as function of that periods actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an in nitely-repeated game wherein players can o¤er one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent regarding how the sur...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012