Mindreading underlies Metacognition
نویسنده
چکیده
This essay defends the view that human metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection. Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive and mindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
منابع مشابه
Metacognition, metamemory, and mindreading in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder.
Metacognition refers to cognition about cognition and encompasses both knowledge of cognitive processes and the ability to monitor and control one's own cognitions. The current study aimed to establish whether metacognition is impaired in autism spectrum disorder (ASD). According to some theories, the ability to represent one's own mental states (an aspect of metacognition) relies on the same m...
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Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article in...
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متن کاملHow we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts
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متن کاملPeter Carruthers
Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 introduces the four accou...
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تاریخ انتشار 2009