Bounded Rationality's Account for the Influence of Group Identification on Ingroup Favoritism: A Field Investigation Using Jewish and Arab Populations in Israel

We used the bounded rationality approach to explore the impact of group identification on intergroup relations. 1,289 Jewish and Arab citizens completed assessments of group identification, functional relations, and indices of ingroup favoritism. Results provided evidence of (a) a positive relation between group identification and ingroup favoritism; (b) perceptions of more positive functional relations that were associated with less ingroup favoritism; and (c) that high-identifiers who evaluated relations as positive experienced the lowest levels of ingroup favoritism. We discuss how the results clarify the complex relation between group identification and ingroup favoritism. According to the bounded rationality approach to understanding intergroup relations (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008; Yamagishi, Terai, Kiyonari, Mifune, & Kanazawa, 2007), the motivation to favor the ingroup results from intragroup considerations. Using this theoretical approach, favoritism expressed in the minimal group context has been modeled repeatedly (for a review, see Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999), with a recent meta-analysis identifying considerable support for the approach’s predictions (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). However, although early theorizing concluded that ingroup favoritism was independent of the degree to which group members identified with their group (e.g., Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000), more recent theoretical elaborations have outlined a pathway by which group identification could affect the expression of ingroup favoritism. The goals of this research were to further investigate that pathway and to test the bounded rationality model using a large real-world sample. Such an endeavor also allowed us to compare the predictions of the bounded rationality approach to those of the dominant model of intergroup relations, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). We begin with an outline of the two theoretical models and how they explain ingroup favoritism in both cooperative and competitive contexts, then discuss the models’ explanations of how group identification affects ingroup favoritism. The bounded rationality approach Consistent with evolutionary accounts of moral development (e.g., Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1972), bounded rationality proposes that human evolutionary history was marked by living in groups, which conferred evolutionary advantages such as food sharing, mating opportunities, and common defense against predators. These groups were marked by generalized exchange, in which each group member expected other group members to cooperate. To avoid exclusion from the group, members were expected to contribute to the group and to cooperate with other members (Shinada & Yamagishi, 2007). Evaluations of ingroup members are hypothesized to be motivated by these intragroup processes. Generalized intragroup exchange dictates that group members are expected to favor ingroup members. In this way, expressing favoritism toward fellow group members is not motivated by an “anti-outgroup” sentiment but rather is a way to meet the perceived expectations of fellow group members. Jin and Yamagishi (1997), for instance, noted that when group members were asked how much they expected ingroup and outgroup members to contribute to them as part of a social task, they expected more from their fellow group members. Consideration of the positive or negative functional relations between groups elucidates what motivates behavior toward ingroup and outgroup members. When relations between groups are negative (competitive), CONTACT R. Matthew Montoya [email protected] University of Dayton, 300 College Park, Dayton, OH 45469. © 2016 Taylor & Francis ingroup members express ingroup favoritism because they expect greater reciprocity from each other (and are expected to reciprocate) than from outgroup members. However, when relations between groups are positive (cooperative), group members expect reciprocity from both ingroup members and outgroup members, which eliminates ingroup favoritism (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Impact of group identification on intergroup