Investment under Ambiguity with the Best and Worst in Mind
نویسنده
چکیده
Recent literature on optimal investment has stressed the difference between the impact of risk and the impact of ambiguity also called Knightian uncertainty on investors’ decisions. In this paper, we show that a decision maker’s attitude towards ambiguity is similarly crucial for investment decisions. We capture the investor’s individual ambiguity attitude by applying α-MEU preferences to a standard investment problem. We show that the presence of ambiguity often leads to an increase in the subjective project value, and entrepreneurs are more eager to invest. Thereby, our investment model helps to explain differences in investment behavior in situations which are objectively identical. JEL Classification: D81, G11
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